Successful Modi visit Down Under, but Diaspora Issues need careful handling
Dr Pradeep Taneja, Academic Fellow, Australia India Institute
This article was originally published in the May 2023 edition of Delhi Policy Group’s East Asia Explorer.
“Prime Minister Modi is the boss,” said Anthony Albanese, the Australian Prime Minister, to a cheering crowd of largely Indian supporters of Mr Modi at a Sydney stadium on 23 May. Albanese was favourably comparing the large size of this audience with his last visit to the same indoor stadium to listen to the American singer and songwriter Bruce Springsteen, who is known to his fans as ‘The Boss’.
Bruce Springsteen is not a household name in India as he is in Australia. Many in the audience could therefore be forgiven for wondering why the leader of Australia would refer to the prime minister of India as the boss. Most took it in the spirit it was meant – as a light-hearted expression of praise for Mr Modi. But others may have taken it more literally.
The Australia-India relationship has gained much traction over the past few years. The two leaders have met six times in the past one year. The strength of the relationship was evident in the welcome accorded to PM Modi during his 22-24 May visit to Sydney. Mr Albanese was also very warmly received in India in March this year. But there were no major bilateral agreements signed during Mr Modi’s visit to Sydney, except an agreement on migration and mobility. This agreement will allow 3,000 young Indian university graduates annually to come and work in Australia for up to two years. The terms of reference for a Green Hydrogen Taskforce were also agreed upon as both countries seek to decarbonise their economies.
The two leaders discussed bilateral cooperation in a whole host of areas, including renewable energy, mining, and critical minerals. They also discussed regional and international issues, including the war in Ukraine and its economic costs, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, India’s and Australia’s development cooperation with the Pacific Island states, and the UN Security Council reform.
Mr Modi again raised the “the issue of temples in Australia and activities of separatist elements” with Prime Minister Albanese. He added that “we will not accept any elements that harm the friendly and warm ties between India and Australia by their actions or thoughts.”[1]
The growing Indian community in Australia – numbering almost eight lakhs – is generally very supportive of the bilateral relationship. It is also proud of India’s economic achievements and the rise in its international stature.
Mr Modi told the Sydney audience that the Indian diaspora was the “real strength” behind the multi-faceted Australia-India relationship. “The real reason and the real strength behind it is you all, every single Indian living in Australia!”[2] The Indian diaspora indeed plays an important role as a bridge between the two countries. Indians in Australia are active across all walks of life, including academia, business, finance, politics, the arts, and law.
But the Indian diaspora is not a unified entity. Indians in Australia – whether they are Australian citizens, permanent residents, students or on temporary work visas – come from different parts of India. They have different religious and political beliefs, speak different languages, and celebrate different festivals. In short, the diaspora is a microcosm of India.
The many segments of the Indian diaspora do not always see eye to eye on various subjects. Occasionally these differences can escalate into clashes, as was witnessed in Melbourne during the so-called Khalistan ‘referendum’ earlier this year.[3] Similarly, the offensive graffiti daubed on some Hindu temples in several Australian cities also displayed the divisions within the Indian diaspora.
These incidents are troubling to community leaders in Australia and to political elites in India. But, fundamentally, these are problems for the Australian federal and state authorities to manage. When diaspora issues impinge on India’s national security, they can and should be discussed at the diplomatic and political levels behind closed doors. Where bilateral cooperation between government agencies of the two countries is needed, it should be requested through official channels.
In fact, such cooperation is already happening, as was implied in Prime Minister Modi’s comments at the joint media event in Sydney, where he thanked his Australian counterpart for “actions that have already been taken.” The two governments should not allow diaspora issues to become a point of friction between the two countries, especially when no fundamental differences exist, and the bilateral relationship is the best it has ever been.
Public airing of these issues may be damaging to bilateral relations, while any domestic political advantage will be short-lived. It might also generate an unwelcome public reaction in Australia, which would cause difficulties for the diaspora and make it harder for the two countries to cooperate in other more critical areas, such as defence and maritime security.