By Senior Policy and Projects Manager – Security and Geopolitics, Grace Corcoran
Bangladesh has delivered a decisive verdict at the ballot box after years of political repression and turmoil. But the ramifications reach beyond Bangladesh’s borders. For neighbouring India, the results present the chance for a reset in a relationship marred by strife since the overthrow of the previous ruling party.
Last week, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its allies won a two-thirds majority in the parliament. The Election Commission declared a nationwide voter turnout of 60.3%, up from 41.8% in the disputed 2024 elections, showing the nation is ready for change.
That 2024 election marked the start of the end for the previous government under the Awami League party, which was banned from contending in these elections. The deposed former prime minister Sheikh Hasina remains exiled in India after a youth-led movement grew to a national protest calling for an end to her increasingly authoritarian and dynastic rule. The perception of an overdependence on India under Hasina led to a break down in relations, which continued under an interim government in Bangladesh given the job of restoring fair elections and overseeing this vote.
The return of the BNP does not signal the end of dynastic rule. Newly elected Prime Minister Tarique Rahman is the son of the founder of BNP and Bangladesh’s sixth president. His mother, Khaleda Zia, the country’s first female prime minister and a fierce rival of Hasina, died in December, just weeks before the election. For decades, Bangladeshi politics has moved between the two parties and their dominant personalities.
Hasina’s links with India developed over her long rule since 2009, fostered by the overlap in the last decade with her Indian counterpart Narendra Modi. Hasina’s Awami League government came to be seen as closely associated with Bangladesh’s giant neighbour, even though episodes of friction remained.
During previous BNP administrations, ties with India were often strained, but not as tense as they became under the interim government. Led by Nobel laureate Mohammad Yunus, diplomatic ties between Bangladesh and India became caught up in allegations of interference and outbursts of political violence.
The last time BNP was in power, India accused Dhaka of tolerating anti-India insurgent groups and failing to stop cross-border weapons flows. Delhi also repeatedly raised concerns about attacks on Hindu minorities across the country and the BNP strengthening ties with China.
Now, India is likely to view these election results as an opportunity for recalibration. The day after the election, Modi congratulated Rahman on the win, emphasising the two countries are “close neighbours with deep-rooted historical and cultural ties”. For his part, Rahman is likely to begin rebuilding relations with India, claiming he wants a “relationship of mutual respect, mutual understanding”.
India would prefer to avoid instability with another of its neighbours, having had troubled ties in recent times with Maldives and Nepal, let alone longstanding hostility with Pakistan and China. Bangladesh, which it shares over 90% of its border with India, has every interest in stability.
One of the earliest tests will be Hasina’s extradition to Bangladesh, where she faces the death penalty after a conviction last year. Rather than allowing this issue to further impact the relationship, Delhi should consider facilitating her relocation to a third country, to remove this tension from the outset. Although this may not be well received in Dhaka, it would remove an obstacle to progress.
Another opportunity for progress will be the long-stalled Teesta River water-sharing agreement. The Teesta is critical for irrigation in northern Bangladesh, particularly during the dry season, and is a lifeline for millions in the region. A draft deal negotiated more than a decade ago was never finalised, reportedly due to opposition from the Indian state government of West Bengal. More recently, the interim government of Bangladesh confirmed Chinese investment in infrastructure development along the river, which Delhi actively opposed. The Chinese backed project is close to the Siliguri Corridor, a 22 kilometre wide strip connecting India’s mainland to its northern states. Resolving this tension would allow both sides to signal goodwill in the relationship.
Beijing has become one of Bangladesh’s most significant economic and development partners, with investments spanning ports, the digital economy, and defence. It is unlikely that a BNP-led government will reverse these ties. Instead, Rahman will likely work to balance its relationships with both Beijing and Delhi.
India will have to accept that China is not leaving Bangladesh any time soon and will have to rebuild the relationship with this mind. At the same time, Dhaka will need to manage the debt and strategic risks that comes with overreliance on a single partner.
With a two-thirds majority, the BNP is well placed to have significant impact on the country’s development and success. Now begins the test to see what the BNP can deliver.