By Senior Policy and Projects Manager – Geopolitics and Security, Grace Corcoran
Possible renewed momentum for the Quad should not distract Canberra from a more reliable option for supporting security in the Indian Ocean: revitalising the Australia–India–France trilateral.
After a 3 February meeting, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar indicated a shared interest in strengthening the Quad. This positive sentiment was reiterated by Jaishankar at the Munich Security Conference on 14 February. This will no doubt be welcome news in Canberra. But the dialogue’s chronic instability means it can’t be relied on to deliver sustained outcomes in a region central to Australia’s security interests.
The Australia–India–France trilateral, announced in 2020, brings together three Indian Ocean powers to cooperate on shared issues in the region. These include maritime safety and security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and environmental concerns. Calls for institutionalising the trilateral have been blocked by bureaucratic constraints among partners, but progress must not wait for structural reforms. This trilateral offers Australia a less aligned but potentially more durable platform for regional engagement than the Quad.
This matters because the Quad’s instability continues to limit its effectiveness. Since the Quad’s resurrection in 2017, the grouping has experienced periods of diplomatic commitment followed by abrupt disengagement. Despite tangible outcomes—including the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre and the distribution of more than 800 million Covid-19 vaccines—its volatility has prevented long-term planning or sustained cooperation.
Amid renewed interest in the Quad, the United States will likely push the partnership to focus on deterring China through engagement around the first island chain in line with its National Defence Strategy, released in January. This could threaten New Delhi’s non-aligned stance or its warming relations with Beijing. It could also reduce the Quad’s agenda in ways that do not serve the Indian Ocean region or Australia’s security interests within it.
The solution is not to abandon the Quad, but to complement it with more resilient, purpose-built partnerships that can deliver on outcomes with Australia’s limited resources. A renewed and reenergised Australia-India-France trilateral is a pragmatic place to start. One pathway for the trilateral’s revival is to align efforts with selected Quad working group priorities relevant to the Indian Ocean. This offers a low-friction way to keep momentum on Quad outcomes even when Quad-level engagement stops.
Climate cooperation is an obvious place to start. A key component of the Quad Climate Working Group is Green Shipping. Green Shipping corridors are trade routes designed to drive development in, and the scale of, zero-emission fuels, vessels, and technologies. According to the Global Maritime Forum’s 2025 Annual Progress Report on Green Shipping Corridors, there are currently 25 initiatives in the Indian Ocean. This is the highest number among all regions, with India and China leading the way. Australia is involved in one of the four corridors that have reached the realisation stage.
Conservation collaboration is another key element of the climate working group. Australia, India and France all administer island territories or maintain close relationships with island communities across the Indian Ocean. These communities are acutely vulnerable to climate impacts—despite geographic distance, they experience similar concerns in their seascape and marine ecosystems. These threats affect livelihoods, health and economic resilience.
There is scope for the trilateral to coordinate conservation efforts across jurisdictions and in partnership with Indian Ocean littoral states. This could begin with a joint trilateral project at the Indian Ocean Rim Association Blue Carbon Hub in Australia or through collaborative investment in green shipping corridors, helping smaller states overcome the feasibility wall that often stalls progress.
Health security provides another opportunity for the trilateral. As the US withdraws from key organisations such as the World Health Organization, gaps in health security are likely to widen. The Quad’s fourth working group focuses on detecting and responding to disease outbreaks, technical engagement and vaccine access, aligning well with the trilateral’s capabilities.
Joint Australia-India-France investment in the SEGA-One Health Network could strengthen the capacity of the epidemiological surveillance and alert management systems in the western Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean Commission and the French Development Agency have financed the network since 2009. Coordinated investment from Australia and India would amplify an existing and effective, albeit stretched, framework preventing disease outbreaks before they spread to other parts of the region.
The Australia-India-France trilateral would supplement, not undermine, the Quad. It would allow Canberra to pursue consistent, effective, long-term initiatives in the Indian Ocean and signal that its engagement in the region extends beyond great power rivalry.
If the Quad is back on, that’s great for Australia. But regardless of its momentum, Canberra should invest in partnerships that can endure political change, and the Australia-India-France trilateral is a great place to start.
This article was originally published in the ASPI Strategist. Image of HMAS Sirius sailing between French Navy frigate FS Surcouf and Indian Navy frigate INS Kiltan in the Bay of Bengal during Exercise La Perouse 2021: Department of Defence.
