By Kim Heriot-Darragh, Research Fellow at the Australia India Institute and Dr Gaurav Saini, Co-founder, Council for Strategic and Defense Research.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has sent shockwaves through the global security landscape. With the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) being put on a burden-sharing timeline and Mr. Trump’s cold transactional approach to security commitments worldwide, the Indo-Pacific too faces a pivotal moment. Yet, this represents a strategic opportunity for middle powers such as India and Australia to deepen their defence relationship.
An alignment of interests
Australia’s strategic geography — bridging the Indian and Pacific Oceans with territories and military presence near Southeast Asia — complements India’s maritime ambitions. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is experienced in coalition operations and can effectively enable Indian military capabilities, as seen in the recently implemented air-to-air refuelling arrangement. Australia’s established relationships with Pacific Island nations align with India’s growing interests. Most importantly, both nations share concerns about China’s assertiveness and a common vision for sovereign resilience and regional stability.
While Japan, South Korea, and Europe are all valuable partners for India, the New Delhi-Canberra defence relationship has quietly built bureaucratic muscles, which are skeletal in other relationships. Over the past decade, successive Australian Prime Ministers and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi have elevated this partnership, with Canberra viewing New Delhi as a “top-tier security partner”. This foundation now provides the perfect launch pad to navigate a world where American security guarantees appear increasingly conditional.
The bureaucratic muscles of the New Delhi-Canberra relationship include the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) 2020 and the 2+2 ministerial dialogue launched in 2021 for high-level strategic coordination. Practical cooperation has advanced through arrangements such as the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), which streamlines logistical support during joint exercises and humanitarian missions, and the November 2024 Air-to-Air refuelling arrangement allowing the Royal Australian Air Force to extend the operational reach of Indian aircraft. Further, key military exercises—AUSTRAHIND (Army), AUSINDEX (Navy), and participation in multilateral exercises such as Pitch Black and Malabar, demonstrate a decade of careful relationship-building.
Neither New Delhi nor Canberra can be expected to fill the gap left by the United States alone. India remains tied to its continental predicament, with an active border dispute with China and both conventional and sub-conventional challenges from Pakistan. Similarly, Australia is undergoing substantive churn in the strategic imagination of its regional role, which involves a complete overhaul of its armed forces, acquisitions of new technologies under the AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.), and increased outreach to smaller island states in its maritime geography.
Given all this, how can both sides ensure that they rise up to face challenges in the regional security architecture? Five aspects need immediate attention.
The focus areas
First, it is time to rebalance defence engagement beyond comfortable silos. While Navy-to-Navy cooperation has flourished, there is a need to break down service barriers. This could be achieved through joint military exercises that reflect real world operations, and moving towards a dedicated forum for joint staff talks. Further, both sides should work towards a major joint, combined exercise within the next decade — one that truly tests their collective capabilities.
Second, India’s defence footprints in Canberra need to reflect the strategic importance of this relationship. It should consider upgrading its Defence Adviser (DA) position in Canberra to a one-star rank. Since this position has always been held by a Navy official, the addition of dedicated Army and Air Force personnel as assistants could help balance the service participation. Further, it needs to have dedicated people for its engagement with the Pacific Islands — work that is currently handled by the very efficient DA in Canberra.
Third, India needs to elevate ground-up ideas from working-level personnel. Too often, strategic dialogues become exercises in diplomatic niceties rather than forums for hard truths. Including more uniformed professionals with operational insights and creating spaces for classified discussions can generate fresh thinking that both nations need. Simple initiatives such as fellowships for staff college graduates or regular war-gaming exchanges would build the mutual understanding that underpins genuine cooperation.
Fourth, India should explore cooperation with Australia in the Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) of naval vessels. New Delhi has successfully displayed its capabilities in this sector with active contracts with the U.S. and British navies. Further, exploring joint manufacturing and provision of patrol boats for small island security forces in the Indian Ocean Region and in the Pacific would again showcase the joint intentions and capabilities of the two sides. These aspects of cooperation in MRO and patrol boats may seem small, but their second and third-order impacts on exposure to each other’s technologies and platforms can be immense.
An opportunity for MSMEs
Finally, defence industry collaboration demands a reset. Given that most of the bigger Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM)s in Australia are field offices of European, East Asian, or American firms, Indian OEMs have preferred to deal directly with their main offices in these countries. Cooperation in the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) sector has been a missed opportunity. Defence and aerospace startups in both countries are at the forefront of cutting-edge technologies. Their outputs in components and dual-use technologies make them ideal to work with each other. Just like New Delhi, Canberra is also implementing an indigenisation programme in the defence sector. Therefore, there is potential to align the MSME sectors in both countries. To enable this, they could explore something similar to the U.S.-India INDUS X model.
This article was originally published in The Hindu. Photo credits: The Hindu.