Seabed warfare, Australia, India & the Indian Ocean

Seabed warfare, Australia, India & the Indian Ocean

By Samuel Bashfield is a defence researcher on the Australia India Institute’s Defence Program.

Seabed warfare is now proliferating in Europe and has the potential to reach the Indian Ocean. A newly released ORF Issue Brief Indian Ocean Seabed Defence: Lessons from Europe looks at military operations in Europe that have targeted seabed cables (data and power), sensors and energy transmission and extraction infrastructure, and how Australia and India should be preparing for the seabed warfare threat.

Seabed warfare 
The Russia-Ukraine conflict and wider Russia-Europe tensions have, in part, played out on the seabed. The sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines in September 2022 represented a return to the past, in which seabed infrastructure were targets for military operations. Three explosions were reported on 26 September 2022, which destroyed three of the four pipelines running from Russia to Germany. Nord Stream is no longer operational, exacerbating Europe’s energy crisis.

Earlier, in January 2022, a communications cable servicing Norway’s Svalbard Satellite Station was cut under mysterious circumstances. France also experienced several instances of cable sabotage in 2022.

Russia is conducting surreptitious and unauthorised surveys of critical seabed infrastructure across Europe, potentially as a prelude to disruption operations. Russia’s Yantar intelligence collection ship was tracked loitering off the Irish coast in August 2021 in the vicinity of the future Celtic Norse communications cable (which will connect Ireland and Norway), as well as AEConnect-1that links Ireland the United States (US). In November 2022, a Russian oceanographic ship was found loitering near offshore wind farms and an oil field in Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK). When approached by journalists at sea, masked men appeared on deck with Russian-style rifles and bullet-proof vests.

In addition to this publicly-reported Russian activity, it should be noted that all sides are playing offense in this new deep sea frontier.

Seabed infrastructure in the Indian Ocean 
There is no reason to believe that the seabed warfare operations currently taking place in Europe won’t reach the Indian Ocean, should regional tensions heighten.

The Indian Ocean is a conduit for submarine cables that both connect Indian Ocean nations and send data further afield. But just as shipping is concentrated at oceanic choke points such as the Malacca Strait and Bab el-Mandeb Strait so too are submarine cables, making them vulnerable to attack at these locations.

Subsea pipelines will also be of increasing importance in the Indian Ocean, especially for India. India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation already operates thousands of kilometres of subsea pipelines off India’s west coast, connecting major fields including Mumbai High, Neelam and Heera, Bassein. Iran is currently considering extending its subsea natural gas pipeline from Oman to India, which would connect to Porbandar in Gujarat. Further, a US$5 billion undersea United Arab Emirates-India gas pipeline was proposed in May 2023, which would also connect to Gujarat.

Australia already has extensive gas pipelines of its North West Shelf in the Indian Ocean, connecting offshore extraction facilities to the mainland. But it will also become vulnerable to seabed warfare in new ways. Australia is prioritising establishing offshore renewable infrastructure, including offshore wind and solar farms, wave energy plants and undersea interconnectors at various sites around Australia’s coast, including the Indian Ocean. Australia may soon begin exporting solar power to Singapore via the world’s longest undersea high voltage direct current cable, the Sub Cable Australia-Asia PowerLink.

Seabed mining exploration is also being undertaken in the Indian Ocean, where polymetallic nodules are in abundance. Such mining will involve a whole new range of players and seabed activities.

Indian Ocean solutions
It is clear that Australia and India share many interests in seabed security in the Indian Ocean.

This will require public discussion and debate on the implications of seabed warfare and how it should be integrated into respective Australian and Indian defence strategies. These should include governance arrangements for seabed warfare responses, capability requirements (e.g., vessels, unmanned and/or autonomous underwater vehicles, sensors, etc.), as well as articulating how human resources and partnerships in seabed warfare should be developed. France recently released its seabed warfare strategy in 2022, which may provide a useful model.

The Indian Ocean comprises various littoral and island nations, many of which do not possess sophisticated navies or coast guards, and there is no overarching grouping such as NATO to coordinate responses. As littoral Indian Ocean states with sophisticated navies and coast guards, Australia and India should take the lead in coordinating with less capable regional nations to monitor seabed infrastructure and develop plans for responses to disruptions. Australia and India can also assist these nations to consider seabed defence as part of regular defence reviews. Such cooperation could also include capability building in underwater domain awareness, capacity building programmes targeting seabed defence techniques, and adding seabed incident response scenarios to joint regional military exercises and drills.

In May 2023, the Quad announced plans to create a Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, through which Australia will establish an Indo-Pacific Cable Connectivity and Resilience Program. The United States agreed to provide capacity building and technical assistance via its ‘CABLES program,’ which is worth US$5 million. It is uncertain whether this programme will be confined to communication cables or whether it will be extended to other types of seabed infrastructure. These initiatives should engage with the wider issue of seabed warfare, and not be limited to communication cables. While the Quad could be an avenue for cooperation, Australia and India should take the lead in working with Indian Ocean neighbours.

Conclusions
Australia and India need to watch seabed warfare developments in Europe closely as a harbinger to potential developments in our region. These two influential Indian Ocean maritime powers need to coordinate to secure Indian Ocean seabed critical infrastructure. As more critical infrastructure traverses the Indian Ocean seabed, a coordinated approach will best protect these assets from catastrophe.

This article is a shortened and modified version of the 2023 ORF Issue Brief ‘Indian Ocean Seabed Defence: Lessons from Europe’. Both papers were written and researched during the author’s visiting fellowship with ORF New Delhi in June 2023 and are part of the Australia India Institute’s Defence Program, undertaken with the support from the Australian Department of Defence. All views expressed are those of the author only.