By Research Fellow Tushar Joshi
Introduction
The most critical issue affecting India–China relations, particularly in terms of security, is their unresolved boundary dispute. This dispute centres on differing perceptions of the nearly 3,488 kilometre-long Line of Actual Control (LAC). The boundary remains contested across three sectors: the Western Sector in Aksai Chin, the Middle Sector covering parts of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, and the Eastern Sector in Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as South Tibet or Zàng Nán.
A series of border incidents between 1959 and 1962, initially linked to developments in Tibet, culminated in the October 1962 India–China War when China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched coordinated attacks on India across the disputed boundary. India suffered a military defeat, and bilateral relations entered a prolonged period of hostility. Despite these setbacks, both countries made efforts to stabilise the situation along the border through agreements such as the 1993 Agreement on Peace and Tranquility and the 1996 Confidence-Building Measures.
For several decades, these arrangements helped prevent large-scale disputes. However, with the rise in China’s military and economic might in the 2000s, its posture along the border became assertive. The last decade alone witnessed a sharp increase in confrontations, including the Depsang stand-off in 2013, Chumar in 2014, Doklam in 2017, and the 2020 clash in the Galwan Valley. The Galwan incident marked the first series of combat-related deaths on the India–China border since 1975, with 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese casualties.
Existing analyses of India’s China policy or India–China relations have largely centred on military capability differences, shifts in deterrence strategies, leadership styles, and broader balance-of-power dynamics. Some scholars argue that India’s overall (military, economic, and diplomatic) response to China in recent times, particularly post 2020, signalled a move from deterrence by denial to deterrence by punishment.[2] Others link the repeated border clashes to India’s growing strategic partnership with the United States (US),[3] or to leadership-level changes under Prime Minister Narendra Modi,[4] combined with concerns in Beijing about India’s expanding border infrastructure and the narrowing of China’s tactical advantages.[5]
While these perspectives offer important insights, they share a common limitation. The debate remains focused on structural and strategic factors. Less attention has been paid to how these security developments have affected the lives of the communities that inhabit these border regions. The Changpas of the Changthang region, many of whom depend heavily on livestock for their daily needs, are the most affected. This brief examines how the border dispute affects their lives and suggests a community-driven grounded approach towards border management.
The Changthang Region and Its Importance to India
Eastern Ladakh, where most of the recent India–China border tensions have occurred, is characterised by a high-altitude plateau marked by vast open valleys and sparse vegetation. A part of this plateau region, stretching across northwestern Tibet and extending into southeastern Ladakh, is commonly known as Changthang (see Figure 2), which means ‘Northerners.’ Only a small part of Changthang crosses into Ladakh; the largest portion is in Tibet, extending into the southern side of Xinjiang in Chinese territory. The region has long supported pastoral activity rather than settled habitation. It experiences extreme cold, strong winds, and high radiation levels. Only a small portion of the land, between 4,500 and 5,000 metres, supports grazing, while settled agriculture is restricted to areas below 4,500 metres above sea level.
Although such extreme conditions indicate that it is of limited economic use, in New Delhi’s strategic calculus, the Changthang region is highly relevant. A large part of the 3,488-kilometre disputed India–China border runs through this region, which also lies next to China’s sensitive Xinjiang and Tibet areas, making it a key security concern, especially after the Chinese incursions since 2020. Changthang is also important because it is a centre of pashmina production and home to the Changpa nomadic community, whose continued pastoral activity sustains India’s human presence in this remote border region. At the same time, the region’s fragile, high-altitude environment makes these livelihoods especially vulnerable to border tensions and militarisation. Considering that, the government has focused on infrastructure and development to improve connectivity, support security forces, and reduce local alienation. Ladakh’s administration as a Union Territory (UT) under direct control from New Delhi reflects the view that centralised governance is necessary for managing such a sensitive frontier, although it raises questions about local participation.
The Changpas of the Changthang Region
The Changpas are a community of nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists mostly residing in eastern Ladakh, along the LAC. Approximately 60 per cent of the villagers depend entirely on livestock for their daily livelihood, while the rest of the population follows a semi-nomadic lifestyle that combines livestock rearing with limited farming activities.[7] While variation exists, livelihoods across the region remain predominantly pastoral due to limited vegetation in the high-altitude terrain.
Most nomadic Changpas live on the elevated plateaus of Rupshu, Kharnak, and the Korzok region. A second category within the community consists of semi-nomadic Changpas, who own small agricultural plots and cultivate them during the summer months. These are found in villages such as Hanle, Koyul, Demchok, Chumurr, Nidhar, Nyoma, Tsaga, Muth, Sato-Kargyam, Phobrang, Lukung, Spangmek, Maan, Merak, and Chushul. Barley is the primary crop grown by these communities.[8]
An important feature of Changpa society is its traditional system of local governance, known as the Goba system. This plays a central role in regulating pastoral life, particularly the use of grazing lands. Grazing territories for each community are clearly demarcated and managed by the goba, or village headman, who serves as the community’s representative and carries “social and cultural-ritual responsibilities.”[9] Individuals or groups who exceed their designated grazing areas are required to pay a penalty to the goba or numberdar of the concerned community. However, the formal governing authority lies with the Ladakh Autonomous Development Hill Council (LADHC). In many areas, the Goba system functions alongside panchayats and the Hill Council, due to the limited reach of formal state institutions.[10]
The animals reared by the Changpas include sheep, goats, yaks, and horses. This community is internationally recognised for producing high-quality pashmina wool, sourced from a specific breed of goat.[11] For this, the Changpas depend on predictable access to grazing lands, seasonal mobility, and locally managed governance arrangements. They face seasonal challenges, particularly in winter when their livestock struggle to access sufficient grazing, resulting in heavy losses for the owners. However, since 2020, heightened security measures have put restrictions on areas close to the LAC and reshaped their everyday decisions related to migration, livestock management, and community life.
The 2020 Border Tension in Eastern Ladakh
The 2020 crisis along the LAC marked a turning point in the management of the India–China border in eastern Ladakh. Early signs of the conflict began to emerge in January 2020, when the PLA initiated military exercises in Tibet.[12] Security analysts speculated whether reports of these exercises in Chinese state-led media were intended to signal China’s military supremacy over India.[13] In response to such actions, the Indian Army also counter-deployed its forces;[14] however, despite receiving intelligence reports regarding the PLA’s westward movements, the army “did not pay heed.”[15] Subsequently, the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting nationwide lockdown further delayed the army’s response.
By mid-April, the PLA had occupied multiple areas claimed by both sides. It undertook strategic and simultaneous moves at five points: the Galwan River Valley, the northern bank of Pangong Tso, the Gogra-Hotsprings region, the Depsang Plains, and Charding Nala in Demchok (see Figure 3).[17] Consequently, a sustained military build-up followed, with the imposition of new access restrictions. Together, these developments brought long-term implications for both border management and civilian access to land.
Post-2020 LAC Tensions and Their Impact on Changpa Pastoral Life
The India–China Galwan Valley clash’s longer-term significance lies in the post-event security arrangements—such as the creation of buffer zones, restrictions on civilian movement, and the expansion of army-controlled areas—and their repercussions.
Limited Access to Grazing Grounds
In his study of the Changtang borderlands of Ladakh, Siddiq Wahid explains that for the residents of these frontier regions, the most pressing challenge is the restriction of grazing areas due to the PLA’s growing aggressiveness.[18] On 2 January 2024, in the Kakjung area of Nyoma village in the Chushul Valley, local herders reportedly pelted stones at a Chinese Army patrol after allegedly being denied access to their traditional grazing lands.[19] The situation has been exacerbated by additional restrictions and controls on civilian movement imposed by Indian security forces in their efforts to “maintain peace.”[20] Consequently, this has increased livelihood pressures for them.
The 2020 Galwan clash had direct repercussions on the Changpas’ economic well-being. For instance, the areas where incursions were reported serve as the winter grazing land for the flocks of nearly 5,000 Changpas. As part of the post-conflict disengagement process, several locations that were previously used for seasonal grazing are now under the Indian Army’s supervision and have become inaccessible due to their proximity to the LAC or their inclusion within buffer zones. Locals reported an increase in the mortality of livestock because nearly 70,000 pashmina goats were directly affected due to this.[21]
A case in point is the Gogra–Hot Springs area. On 8 December 2022, as per the consensus reached during the 16th round of the India–China Corps Commander Level Meeting, Indian and Chinese troops in the area (PP-15) began to disengage (see Figure 4).[22] However, civilian accounts highlight persistent issues of land inaccessibility. For instance, Konchok Stobgais, the goba of Phobrang village, located approximately 60 km from PP-17, said that following the 2020 clash, the Indian Army had stopped graziers from accessing land at Ani La, Thadang Valley, and Naglungpa.[23] He further stated that with each disengagement process, the army moved further back, thereby creating new buffer zones, and reported the loss of around 41 km of the Kugrang Valley.[24] However, the reliability of civilian accounts remains a matter of debate, given the limitations associated with access to formal land records for the region.
Further, the Pangong Tso region, particularly the stretch between Finger 4 (F4) and Finger 8 (F8) (see Figure 3), represents one of the most visible examples of restricted access. Prior to 2020, Changpa herders were able to use these areas for grazing, at least up to F6, especially during the summer months, according to Konchok Stanzin, a former councillor of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC).[26] However, post 2020 and following the disengagement arrangements, civilian movement beyond F4 has remained restricted,[27] effectively removing large tracts of pastureland from use.
There have also been instances where restrictions on grazing have been relaxed. For instance, until 2023, grazing in the Chushul area was restricted to Rezang La, Chang La, Tsaga La, Kajukonla, and Parma. In 2024, however, security forces allowed grazing to resume in areas such as Goswami Hill, Gurung Hill, Yunlung, Lunang, Lungpa, Nangchalang, and Yakgang, among others.[28] Similarly, at the army’s annual press conference in 2025, Indian Army Chief Upendra Dwivedi, referring to the October 2024 disengagement deal, said that patrolling and traditional grazing have commenced in the Depsang and Demchok areas.[29] Despite these relaxations, nomadic communities continue to demand access to more of their traditional grazing lands.
These measures were framed as temporary security arrangements, but they have been prolonged, resulting in a lasting reduction in available grazing land. For a pastoral system that depends on wide spatial mobility to prevent overgrazing, even limited losses of pasture have economic consequences.
Changes in Migration and Livelihood Patterns
For decades, residents of high-altitude villages in Ladakh have sought education, employment, and services in larger town centres.[30] However, post 2020, security developments have altered the economic context in which these migration decisions are made.
Restrictions on access to traditional grazing lands and the resulting reduction of pastoral space have intensified economic pressures on households that depend heavily on livestock. This has led to an increase in distress livestock sales and a growing shift toward non-pastoral activities, such as tourism, trade, and wage labour.[31] As discussed in the previous section, restrictions in areas around PP-15 to PP-17 have had a significant impact (see Figure 4). For example, Phobrang village in this region comprises approximately 113 households with a population of 615 people and extends over an area of about 600 square kilometres.[32] While this land may appear barren, it is of considerable value to local nomads for livestock rearing, particularly Pashmina goats. This has led nomadic households to migrate towards urban centres like Leh, which are already densely populated, in search of alternative opportunities.[33]
Rural-to-urban migration is not necessarily a negative trend. In a broader way, migration helps diversify household income and reduce economic risk.[34] Migrants in urban centres often send remittances to their families in rural areas, which contributes to poverty reduction,[35] as noted by Chaudhary and Namgail (2022),[36] in their study on Ladakh. They also identify a trend termed the “feminisation of agriculture,” where women assume primary responsibility for farming activities and decision-making when male household members migrate to urban centres.[37]
However, depopulation of villages along the border weakens human presence in strategic areas, potentially creating vacuums that could be exploited by adversaries like China. That is why maintaining vibrant, economically viable communities in border regions is not just a development priority, but a strategic necessity.
Government Responses and Development Programmes
Following the 2020 tensions along the LAC, the Indian government intensified its focus on border regions. This shift went beyond stronger security posture, comprising renewed policy attention to development, livelihoods, and population retention in borderland areas, underscoring the link between territorial security and the well-being of communities living in proximity to the disputed region.
One of the earliest and most enduring initiatives in this direction is the Border Area Development Programme (BADP), implemented by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in 1986–87. It aims to address developmental needs in border villages by supporting infrastructure related to health, education, water resources, skill development, and financial inclusion.[38] Although initially targeted towards India’s western borders, the BADP’s scope has gradually expanded to the eastern and northern border regions, including areas adjoining China.[39]Considering the strategic sensitivity of the India–China frontier, the programme allows up to an additional 10 percent of the total allocated funds for villages along this border to address region-specific needs.[40]
However, the broad mandate of the BADP and the changing nature of security challenges along the LAC pushed the government to introduce a more targeted intervention—the Vibrant Villages Programme (VVP), launched in 2023. This programme addresses the problem of depopulation in border areas by creating “sufficient incentive for people to stay on in the selected villages” and is often seen as India’s response to China’s rapid infrastructural development and settlement policies in border regions.[41]
The VVP has identified 662 villages across 19 districts in Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand, and the UT of Ladakh, with 35 villages located in Ladakh.[42] The first phase of the programme (2022–23 to 2025) was allocated a budget of INR 4,800 crore, under which 6,045 activities had been completed by July 2024, including training programmes, healthcare initiatives, and tourism promotion. On 2 April 2025, the government approved VVP-II, with the allocation of INR 6,839 crore until FY2028–29.[43]Interventions under the programme focus on livelihood generation through tourism and cultural heritage promotion, skill and entrepreneurship development, agricultural adaptation, road connectivity, village infrastructure, healthcare, education, renewable energy, and telecom services.
A notable trend is the gradual shift in funding from the BADP to the VVP. While BADP allocations have declined over the past decade, funding for VVP has increased steadily since its launch, as shown in Figure 5.[44] This shift reflects a more differentiated approach to border development, with greater emphasis on villages along the India–China border and on population retention as a strategic objective.
Regarding the impact of the VVP in Ladakh and particularly for the Changthang region, it is too early to reach any conclusion, as no assessment has been carried out so far. But some data is available on how it is being rolled out. In its first phase of implementation (February 2023–March 2025), 2,558 projects worth INR 3431 crore were sanctioned by the MHA, 88 of which, with the approved cost of INR 95.76 crore, were sanctioned for the Ladakh region. Further, under VVP-I, over 8,000 activities were conducted in total, with 2,221 of them in Ladakh, including capacity building, service delivery camps, and health and veterinary camps. [46] The implementation of the second phase (2025–29) of the VVP, for which INR 6,839 crore has been approved, is yet to be seen and studied.
Besides, the government has also prioritised physical connectivity in Ladakh, with sustained investment in border infrastructure through the Border Roads Organisation (BRO). The BRO’s budget increased from approximately INR 2,000 crore in 2014–15[47] to INR 7,146 crore in 2025, reflecting the growing importance of road connectivity in high-altitude border regions. Institutional changes have accompanied this financial expansion; since January 2015, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has exercised full operational and financial control over the BRO, streamlining decision-making and project execution.[48]
Ladakh has received particular attention within this framework. In December 2022, the MoD entrusted the BRO with the construction of roads in border areas, based on priorities identified by the army under a five-year Long-Term Roll-over Works Plan (LTRoWP). Under this plan, Ladakh was allocated 3,140.535 km of road construction, the highest among all states and UTs.[49] More recently in 2025, during a visit to Ladakh, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced the completion of 125 border infrastructure projects, comprising 28 roads, 93 bridges, and 64 miscellaneous works, at a cost of INR 5,000 crore, marking the highest value set of projects completed by the BRO to date.[50]
In addition to these broader initiatives, the government has also introduced Changthang-specific measures aimed at supporting nomadic livelihoods. The Changthang Development Package, implemented under the Special Development Package (SDP), was sanctioned to the UT of Ladakh in 2020 following long-standing demands from local representatives. Implemented primarily through the Sheep and Animal Husbandry Department, it includes the strengthening of veterinary hospitals in Nyoma and Durbuk, the creation of fodder banks, construction of livestock shelters, and investments in educational and sports infrastructure, including a multipurpose indoor stadium in Changthang and other development commitments.[51]
Further, Ladakh, in partnership with private entrepreneurs, has introduced initiatives to sustain pashmina production. Producing pashmina in the high-altitude Changthang region is labour-intensive, a livelihood the Changpas have followed for generations. But many now seek more comfortable means of living with better economic opportunities, even if that means moving away from pashmina work.[52] To address this, the administration is offering incentives to the Changpas, promoting research and development (R&D) in pure pashmina designs, and improving schools, infrastructure, healthcare, and roads in the region.[53] Awareness campaigns also highlight the difference between Ladakhi (pure) pashmina as “Mudu Unna” and Kashmir’s Geographical Indication (GI)-tagged “Kashmir Pashmina,” which is blended with other materials.[54] Since 2019, after Ladakh’s separation from Jammu and Kashmir, Leh-based millennial entrepreneurs have promoted local pashmina at a global level, using traditional methods to build its unique identity.[55]
Potential administrative reforms have also been discussed. The proposed creation of five new districts—Changtang, Zanskar, Nubra, Sham, and Drass—in Ladakh is intended to improve administrative reach, decentralise governance, and enhance access to public services in remote and border areas. For sparsely populated regions with difficult terrain, such restructuring is expected to reduce logistical barriers and improve service delivery.
Civil–military engagement has also been a key component of the government’s approach in Ladakh. Under Operation SADBHAVANA, the Indian Army has undertaken many welfare activities aimed at strengthening social cohesion in border areas. Some of those are healthcare outreach, education support, skill development initiatives, and basic infrastructure projects. As of 2022–23, the army operates seven Army Goodwill Schools in Ladakh, educating over 2,200 students, and has allocated INR 8.82 crore under Operation SADBHAVANA to the region.[56] These initiatives reflect a multilayered government response that links border security with development and population retention.
Gaps in Existing Approaches
One of the main drawbacks of the system is that existing approaches are shaped primarily by administrative and security imperatives, with limited inclusion of the livelihood systems that have historically anchored human presence in these regions. Programmes such as the BADP and the VVP focus on fixed assets, village infrastructure, and alternative employment generation. These interventions are important; however, they are less suited to mobile pastoral communities whose economic security is linked to seasonal access to grazing lands. Consequently, the most pressing challenge—restricted access to traditional pastures—of the region’s inhabitants remains only indirectly addressed.
Further limitation lies in the disconnect between border governance and local knowledge systems. Public reporting and policy documents indicate that decisions pertaining to disengagement, buffer zones, and movement restrictions are negotiated and implemented mostly through military and diplomatic channels, with minimal scope for consultation with borderland civilians.[57] Local grazing practices, seasonal movement, and informal landmarks constitute a form of everyday territorial presence, and when these practices are disrupted without livelihood safeguards or communication mechanisms, they weaken both economic resilience and civilian confidence in state institutions. This is noteworthy in a context where long-term migration pressures already exist, and where reduced livelihood viability would accelerate population decline in strategically sensitive areas.
Another area that requires policymakers’ attention is the absence of regulated cross-border trade in the Changthang sector. Unlike other parts of the LAC, pastoral communities in Changthang—across Ladakh and Tibet—have had historical economic engagement, which came to a sort of halt with the formation of modern state border and increased securitisation after the 1962 war. This gradual fading of interaction between Ladakhi and Tibetan Changpas has been described as “alienated borderland,” constituted by keeping cross-border linkages at a minimum level through controlled movement.[58] This alienation is also an overlooked factor that has resulted in the disruption of traditional grazing land, which has led to weakened economic resilience.
Moreover, the creation of the UT of Ladakh in 2019 fulfilled a long-standing demand of Ladakhis to secure direct administrative attention from New Delhi and reduce governance dependence on Srinagar.[59] However, the absence of an elected legislature and the non-extension of Sixth Schedule protections have resulted in what Amitabh Mattoo describes as, “In place of autonomy came administration.”[60] This has contributed to perceptions that the functional space of institutions such as LAHDCs and panchayats, and customary bodies like the Goba, has narrowed. Since 2021, these concerns have found expression in continuing demands for statehood and constitutional safeguards, leading to protests led by civil-society actors such as Sonam Wangchuk, a Ladakh-based educationist and environmental activist. Although these demands are outside the scope of border management alone, they demonstrate a structural gap in Ladakh’s current governance model.
Recommendations
Institutionalise Civilian Consultation in Border Governance
Most of the existing agreements (1993, 1996, 2005, 2013) signed between India and China towards stabilisation of the region confine decision-making to military and diplomatic channel, sidelining civilian inputs. This centralised approach has direct consequences for grazing access, seasonal mobility, and village sustainability. To overcome this, the MHA and MoD should jointly mandate regular civil–military liaison mechanisms at the district and subdistrict levels in Ladakh, building on precedents such as the Civil–Military Liaison Conferences used in disaster management.[61] Structured engagement with village councils, nomadic associations, and panchayats would potentially improve local compliance, reduce friction with security forces, and ensure that security decisions do not inadvertently undermine India’s long-term territorial presence.
Recognise Pastoral Mobility as a Strategic Asset, not a Liability
The understanding that traditional grazing routes overlap with contested spaces, which makes pastoralists critical stakeholders in border stability, should reflect in policymaking as well. Instead of blanket restrictions, India should adopt controlled and monitored grazing access in traditionally used areas, supported by local administration and security agencies. International border management literature shows that civilian presence in disputed areas strengthens de facto claims when sustained over time.[62] Preventing pastoral access altogether risks creating vacuums that can later be exploited through non-military means.
Calibrate Economic Engagement Between Ladakhi and Tibetan Changthang
Considering the absence of economic engagement across Ladakhi and Tibetan Changthang, the possibility of a calibrated economic interaction in this sector is worth exploring. A controlled and carefully monitored approach, which also takes into account security sensitivities, could increase pashmina production, working as an economic incentive and stabiliser for the Changpa community on both sides, and would also contribute to border villages’ stabilisation.
Improve Transparency and Communication
Another issue lies in lack of transparency in communication of border-related agreements, such as the 2024 disengagement deal, to borderland residents. Thus, deal provisions remain poorly understood at the local level. Clear communication about what has changed, why it has changed, and what remains restricted, is essential to rebuild trust between civilians and the state. Transparency does not weaken security; it strengthens legitimacy.
Beyond security, locals are often unaware of government initiatives designed for their benefit. For example, many Changpas do not know about the UT’s ambitious pashmina project, including the industry department’s planned investment in growing Ladakh’s INR 100 crore pashmina sector and filing for a GI tag for Changthang goats.[63] Many are also unaware of government support for pashmina development, such as in 2020 when, despite the pandemic, the All Changthang Pashmina Growers Marketing Cooperative Society bought 17 tonnes of pashmina with INR 300 crore government backing to prevent distress sales.[64] Thus, a sustainable border strategy requires integrating civilians, especially nomadic communities, into governance.
Strengthen the Formal Role of Local Bodies in Border Governance and Development Planning
Local institutions in Ladakh, including the LAHDC, panchayats (through the Block Development Council), and customary authorities such as the goba should be formally integrated into border governance and development processes. At present, they function largely as transmission mechanisms for centrally designed schemes rather than decision-making partners. The UT administration should institutionalise consultative mandates that require district-level inputs from LAHDCs and panchayats on issues directly affecting grazing access, land use, and mobility in border areas, and recognise the Goba as an advisory authority in matters related to pastoral routes and seasonal use. This way, knowledge gaps between remote communities and the administration can be bridged and it would also reduce potential implementation failures in border management and development programmes. Security imperatives would then be better aligned with local realities. As Mattoo (2025) argues, effective border governance must “balance security, ecology, and empowerment in a way that secures both the frontier and the faith of its people”[65]—a balance that cannot be achieved without restoring meaningful institutional local agency.
Conclusion
The experience of the Changpa pastoralists of eastern Ladakh demonstrates that border security should not just be about military deployments and diplomatic negotiations, but take into account how security decisions intersect with everyday civilian life. Post-2020 tensions along the LAC have disrupted access to grazing grounds, altered livelihood and mobility patterns, and placed pressure on the long-sustained nomadic way of life in Changthang. While the government has responded through increased infrastructure investment and targeted development programmes, gaps remain in consultation, communication, and institutional integration at the local level. A sustainable border strategy, therefore, requires recognising border communities not as passive beneficiaries or security risks, but as stakeholders whose presence, mobility, and knowledge can contribute to long-term stability.
Endnotes
[1] “Thin Ice in the Himalayas: Handling the India-China Border Dispute | International Crisis Group,” International Crisis Group, November 14, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/india-china/334-thin-ice-himalayas-handling-india-china-border-dispute.
[2] Soumyodeep Deb, “From Denial to Punishment: Strategic Shift in India’s Deterrence Strategy towards China Post-Galwan,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs (2025), 12, no. 3: 315–39, https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970251351402.
[3] Harsh V. Pant and Vivek Mishra, “China’s 2020 Line of Actual Control (LAC) Incursion: A Function of India-US Ties?” in Why Did China Intrude along the Disputed Border with India in May 2020? ed. Raj Varma, (New Delhi: Routledge, 2025); Michelguglielmo Torri, “The Road to Galwan Valley: An Alternative View of India’s Relations with China and the US since 2005,” Asia Maior: The Journal of the Italian Think Tank on Asia (2022).
[4] Liu Zongyi, “Why Did the Bloody Galwan Clash Take Place?”, AsiaGlobal Online, https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/why-did-bloody-galwan-clash-take-place.
[5] Stephen P. Westcott, “Seizing a Window of Opportunity? The Causes and Consequences of the 2020 Sino-Indian Border Stand-Off,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8, no. 1 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797021992527.
[6] “Changthang Plateau,” Himalayan Ecotourism, n.d., https://www.himalayanecotourism.com/changthang-ladakh/.
[7] Tsering Choldan, “Impact of India-China Border Conflicts on the Changpas of Eastern Ladakh,” Strategic Analysis 48, no. 2 (2024): 87, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2024.2357461.
[8] Choldan, “Impact of India-China Border Conflicts on the Changpas of Eastern Ladakh,” 88.
[9] Shrishtee Bajpai and Ashish Kothari, “The Goba of Ladakh: Current Relevance of a Traditional Governance System,” (Kalpavriksh and Ladakh Buddhist Association, 2022), 10, https://ruralindiaonline.org/en/library/resource/the-goba-of-ladakh-current-relevance-of-a-traditional-governance-system/.
[10] Bajpai and Kothari, “The Goba of Ladakh,” 11.
[11] Padma Dolker, “Nomadic Pastoralism of Changthang, Ladakh, at a Crossroads: Changing Socioeconomic Characteristics, Livelihood and Livestock Composition,” SN Social Sciences 2, no. 1 (2021): 2, https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-021-00302-7.
[12] Press Trust of India, “China’s PLA Begins Major Military Exercises in Tibet,” The Week, January 6, 2020, https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2020/01/06/chinas-pla-begins-major-military-exercises-in-tibet.html.
[13] Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Pulkit Mohan, “PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India,” Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/research/pla-joint-exercises-in-tibet-implications-for-india.
[14] Manoj Joshi, “Eastern Ladakh, the Longer Perspective,” Observer Research Foundation, November 14, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/eastern-ladakh-the-longer-perspective.
[15] Sandeep Unnithan, “China’s Stealth Attack,” India Today, August 1, 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20200810-china-s-stealth-attack-1706401-2020-08-01.
[16] Defense Mapping Agency, English: “Visible Are Pangong Tso and Spanggur Tso, Chushul, and Other Landmarks,” September 2020, Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin. ([1]); also United States Geological Survey ([2]), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ladakh_LAC_Pangong_Tso_Spanggur_Tso_Landmarks.jpg?st_source=ai_mode.
[17] Joshi, “Eastern Ladakh, the Longer Perspective,” 4.
[18] Siddiq Wahid, “The Changthang Borderlands of Ladakh: A Preliminary Inquiry,” no. 187 (Research and Information System for Developing Countries [RIS], 2014).
[19] Jehangir Ali, “Ladakh: Local Herders Clash with Chinese Soldiers over Access to Grazing Land,” The Wire, January 30, 2024, https://thewire.in/security/ladakh-local-herders-clash-with-chinese-solders-over-access-to-grazing-land.
[20] Wahid, “The Changthang Borderlands of Ladakh,” 12–13.
[21] Anees Zargar, “Nomadic Pastoralists in Ladakh Face ‘Exodus’ as Indo-China Tension Spikes Along LAC,” NewsClick, June 4, 2020, https://www.newsclick.in/nomadic-pastoralists-ladakh-face-exodus-Indo-China-tension-spikes-LAC
[22] Dinakar Peri, “India, China Troops Disengage at LAC Friction Point in Ladakh,” Hindu, September 8, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-china-begin-disengagement-in-gogra-hotsprings-pp-15-in-eastern-ladakh/article65866319.ece.
[23] Vijaita Singh, “Grazing Lands Turning into Buffer Zones, Says Chief of Village Bordering LAC,” Hindu, September 20, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/grazing-lands-turning-into-buffer-zones-says-chief-of-village-bordering-lac/article65914105.ece.
[24] Singh, “Grazing Lands Turning into Buffer Zones, Says Chief of Village Bordering LAC.”
[25] Joshi, “Eastern Ladakh,” 11.
[26] Rashme Sehgal, “China’s ‘Creeping Aggression’ In Ladakh: Experts Warn of Land Loss, Locals Say Grazing Areas Gone,” Free Press Journal, August 9, 2025, https://www.freepressjournal.in/analysis/chinas-creeping-aggression-in-ladakh-experts-warn-of-land-loss-locals-say-grazing-areas-gone.
[27] Rashme Sehgal, “Amit Shah Was Told India Has Lost 26 of 65 Patrolling Points in Ladakh,” Rediff, February 13, 2023, https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/konchok-stanzin-chinese-are-nibbling-away-at-our-territory/20230213.htm.
[28] Rahul Tripathi, “Grazing in East Ladakh’s Higher Regions Allowed; Shepherds Eye Pre-2020 Heights,” Economic Times, July 29, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/grazing-in-east-ladakhs-higher-regions-allowed-shepherds-eye-pre-2020-heights/articleshow/112116655.cms?from=mdr.
[29] Scroll Staff, “Patrolling, Grazing in Traditional Areas has Begun in Ladakh’s Demchok, Depsang: Army Chief,”Scroll.In, January 13, 2025, https://scroll.in/latest/1077875/patrolling-grazing-in-traditional-areas-has-begun-in-ladakhs-demchok-depsang-army-chief
[30]“Climate Migration: Nomads Move to Towns in Warming Ladakh,” Arab News, November 2, 2022, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2192536/amp; Reena Chaudhary and Dorjay Namgail, “Consequences of Rural-to-Urban Migration in Ladakh: A Comprehensive Analysis of Impacts on Areas of Origin and Destination,” IJFANS International Journal of Food and Nutritional Sciences, December 2022.
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[38] Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, “Border Area Development Programme (BADP): Guidelines (2020),” (MHA, 2020), 1.
[39] N. Manoharan et al., “Secure Through Development: Evaluation of India’s Border Area Development Programme,” Strategic Analysis 44, no. 1 (2020): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1699993.
[40]Ministry of Home Affairs, “Border Area Development Programme (BADP): Guidelines (2020),” 3.
[41]Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2157894®=3&lang=2; Karishma Hasnat, “Vibrant Village Programme Bringing People Back to LAC Villages; Tourists Knocking,” The Print, December 6, 2024, https://theprint.in/thefineprint/vibrant-village-programme-bringing-people-back-to-lac-villagestourists-knocking/2388594/.
[42]Ministry of Home Affairs, “Vibrant Village Programme”.
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[46] Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, “Implementation of Vibrant Village Programme,” (MHA, February 3, 2026), https://www.pib.gov.in/www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2222585
[47] Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Government of India, ‘Annual Report 2014-15’, (MoRTH, nd).
[48] Sushant Singh, “Border Roads Organisation: Tight Funds, Uphill Goals in a Tough Terrain,” Indian Express, May 18, 2016, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/border-roads-organisation-tight-funds-uphill-goals-in-a-tough-terrain-2806057/.
[49] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1884099.
[50] Ministry of Defence MOD Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2199999.
[51]The Administration of Union Territory of Ladakh, “Prin Secy Planning Reviews Rs 129 Cr Changthang Package under SDP,” September 2, 2021, https://ladakh.gov.in/prin-secy-planning-reviews-rs-129-cr-changthangpackage-under-sdp/.
[52] Pooja Singh, “Ladakhis Want to Reclaim Pashmina. But Can They?”, Mint, May 8, 2021, https://www.livemint.com/mint-lounge/ideas/ladakhis-want-to-reclaim-pashmina-but-can-they-111620390599890.html.
[53] Editor, “Ladakh Goes Aggressive on Promoting Indigenous Pashmina,” J&K / Ladakh, JK Post, January 16, 2021, https://www.jkpost.in/2021/01/16/ladakh-goes-aggressive-on-promoting-indigenous-pashmina/.
[54] Singh, “Ladakhis Want to Reclaim Pashmina. But Can They?”
[55] Nidhi Adlakha, “How Ladakh’s Locals Are Actively Boosting the Region’s Fashion, Culinary Heritage,” Hindu, April 5, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/life-and-style/travel/ladakh-leh-travel-2023-fashion-art-food-community/article66652506.ece.
[56] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1895974.
[57] Siddiq Wahid, “Why India’s Response to the China Challenge in Ladakh Is so Lopsided,” Frontline, September 7, 2023, https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/why-india-response-to-the-china-challenge-in-ladakh-is-so-lopsided/article67263196.ece.
[58] Dhananjay Tripathi and Amit Dogra, “Alienation That Continues: Changpas—A Borderland Community,” Society and Culture in South Asia 11, no. 1 (2025): 50–71, https://doi.org/10.1177/23938617241282487.
[59] Amitabh Mattoo, “Centre, Not Frontier,” Hindu, October 8, 2025, https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/centre-not-frontier-ladakh-needs-respect-not-patronage-prnt/cid/2126700.
[60] Mattoo, “Centre, Not Frontier.”.
[61]The Administration of Union Territory of Ladakh, “Civil-Military Conference in Kharu Fosters ‘Whole of Nation Approach’,” August 29, 2025, https://ladakh.gov.in/civil-military-conference-in-kharu-fosters-whole-ofnation-approach/.
[62] Matt Evans, “Defending Territorial Sovereignty Through Civilian Settlement: The Case of Israel’s Population Dispersal Policy,” Israel Affairs 12, no. 3 (2006): 578–96, https://doi.org/10.1080/13537120600747225.
[63] Singh, “Ladakhis Want to Reclaim Pashmina. But Can They?”
[64] Singh, “Ladakhis Want to Reclaim Pashmina. But Can They?”
[65] Amitabh Mattoo, “In Ladakh, Balance Security with Sensitivity,” Indian Express, October 3, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/balance-security-with-sensitivity-10284351/.
This article was originally published by the Observer Research Foundation. Image sourced from the International Crisis Group.