Written by Sanchari Ghosh
Anthony Albanese’s electoral victory in Australia, securing a second term as Prime Minister, marks a moment of both continuity and cautious optimism for India-Australia relations. For New Delhi, the re-election of a leader who has invested political capital in strengthening bilateral ties is a welcome development. But as Australia recalibrates its foreign policy in the shadow of intensifying US-China competition and a volatile Indo-Pacific, India must consider how a renewed Labor mandate may shape both the strategic and normative contours of this important partnership.
The Trajectory So Far: Bipartisanship and the India Moment
The past decade has seen a remarkable elevation of India-Australia relations, from relative indifference to active strategic alignment. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), growing naval cooperation, and critical mineral trade all reflect this shift. Albanese’s Labor government, since coming to power in 2022, continued this momentum, evident in the high-level exchanges, including his visit to India in March 2023 and Prime Minister Modi’s reciprocal visit to Sydney in May 2023. Crucially, this transformation enjoys bipartisan consensus. Both the Liberal and Labor parties now view India as a key partner in ensuring a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. The India Economic Strategy to 2035, first drafted under the Liberals, has found resonance in Labor’s policymaking. The Early Harvest Trade Agreement (IndAus ECTA), implemented under Albanese, was seen as a stepping stone toward a more comprehensive agreement. Therefore, Albanese’s return is unlikely to disrupt the current trajectory. If anything, his second term provides policy stability and the space to deepen ties beyond defense and trade into areas like education, climate, and technology.
The India-Australia Equation in a Multipolar Indo-Pacific
Albanese’s foreign policy outlook is shaped by three intertwined objectives: hedging against China’s assertiveness, reinforcing Australia’s regional influence, and positioning itself as a reliable, values-based middle power. India fits well into all three frames.
First, India serves as a natural counterbalance to China’s growing military and economic reach. Australia’s embrace of India in multilateral forums like QUAD, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and regional dialogues reflects Australia’s recognition that New Delhi’s weight can buttress a multipolar regional order. Secondly, Albanese has emphasized Australia’s Pacific “family”— a move aimed at repairing relationships frayed under his predecessors. Here, India’s development partnership model — capacity-building, solar cooperation, disaster resilience—can complement Australia’s Pacific outreach. Coordinated engagement with countries like Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands could offer a soft power counter-narrative to Chinese infrastructure diplomacy. Thirdly, Albanese’s foreign policy language often invokes values: democracy, transparency, and human rights. While these ideas sit comfortably within QUAD rhetoric, they occasionally pose friction in India-Australia dialogues, especially around issues like media freedom, citizenship laws, and civil liberties. Steering through this normative divergence without allowing it to overshadow strategic convergence will be a test of diplomatic maturity in his second term.
The Domestic-Strategic Nexus: Education, Diaspora, and Technology
One area where Albanese’s return can yield tangible gains is education. With Indian students making up a significant portion of international enrollments in Australian universities, the diaspora is both a demographic and economic force. The 2023 Migration and Mobility Partnership Arrangement (MMPA) between the two countries, aimed at facilitating professional and student mobility, holds potential for deeper people-to-people linkages. This also aligns with Albanese’s tech and innovation agenda. India’s growing tech sector and Australia’s research ecosystem can find common ground in AI, clean energy, cybersecurity, and digital public infrastructure. Joint ventures, startup incubation, and academic exchange require more structured investment. The diaspora, particularly the Indian-Australian community, now over 700,000 strong, is also a significant vector in this relationship. Albanese has acknowledged their role in strengthening ties, and his political outreach to this community reflects a broader recognition of their electoral and economic significance.
Climate, Critical Minerals, and the Green Transition
Climate cooperation is likely to be a central plank of Albanese’s second-term foreign policy. His government has already legislated more ambitious emission targets and is promoting Australia as a clean energy superpower. This creates opportunities for convergence with India’s climate goals under the ISA (International Solar Alliance), LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment), and green hydrogen programs. Australia is also a crucial supplier of critical minerals needed for India’s energy transition and digital economy. The 2022 MoU on critical minerals cooperation — focusing on lithium, cobalt, and rare earths—needs rapid operationalization. Albanese’s domestic push for mineral processing, coupled with India’s PLI (Production Linked Incentive) schemes, could foster a rare synergy between industrial policy and strategic goals.
However, despite strong political will, some structural challenges remain. Trade negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) have seen slow progress. Issues around market access, services, and labor mobility persist. Albanese must now decide whether to invest political capital in resolving these or allow negotiations to stagnate, risking loss of momentum. Another concern is the potential for divergence on global issues. For example, India’s nuanced stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, its strategic autonomy, and cautious approach toward Western coalitions occasionally frustrate Canberra’s expectations. While Australia seeks alignment, India prioritizes autonomy. Albanese’s diplomacy must reconcile this difference without resorting to conditionality. Moreover, Albanese’s domestic political agenda — especially cost-of-living issues, housing, and indigenous rights — may constrain how much bandwidth his government devotes to foreign policy, particularly with an electorate that prioritizes local concerns.
Albanese’s re-election offers India an opportunity to consolidate and diversify a relationship that is no longer limited to occasional gestures or transactional interests. His government has already shown intent to approach India as a long-term strategic partner, not merely a counterweight to China, but as a rising civilizational power with shared regional stakes. To make the most of this moment, both sides must act with purpose. India should leverage its G20 legacy and IORA leadership to shape regional norms in partnership with Canberra. Australia, in turn, must respect and adapt to India’s strategic culture—non-aligned, plural, and pragmatic. A second Albanese term is not a game-changer, but it is a stabilizer. In a region defined by flux, that alone is valuable.