By CEO Lisa Singh
Much has been made of the ongoing demise of multilateralism. The rules-based international order is under strain and regional actors face no choice but to find solutions to respond to this contestation and uncertainty. They seek stronger collaboration with partners they can rely on who share the same commitment of peace and progress for the region.
This was the focus of the recent ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) Forum led by Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies, where I had the opportunity to discuss alternative ways of building convergence and collaboration to address shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
Specifically, the discussion sought answers as to why countries are not aligning their Indo-Pacific strategies with the AOIP and its principles of openness, inclusivity, transparency and international law. Debate focused on how their convergence with AOIP remains limited and collaboration still nascent. (I had to admit I wasn’t aware of the AOIP until my participation at the forum).
Fortunately, Australia has aligned cooperation with AOIP and recently announced the Aus4ASEAN Futures Initiative to directly support the implementation of the AOIP priorities on digital economy integration, sustainable urban development and climate resilience.
The forum was a refreshing event. It bravely sought answers to the barriers that hinder cooperation and how to move beyond mere synergies to a more meaningful engagement with partners. There was the realisation shared amongst Southeast Asian speakers of the need to move away from a nostalgia of US-led support in the region, and that while Southeast Asia had benefited from a US-led world order, that that has now come to an end. Regional players such as ASEAN are increasingly asserting their agency and defining their place and engagement on their own terms.
Why is any of this important? The region is home to two-thirds of the world’s economy and population, drives two-thirds of global growth and handles more than 60% of global maritime trade. Such a scale brings opportunity, yet it also amplifies vulnerability. Between 1970 and 2022 the Indo-Pacific experienced an average of nearly ten disasters every month linked to climate, weather, water and seismic events. Projections suggest that as many as 89 million people may become climate refugees by 2050, with over 80% of the region’s population directly affected.
The Indo-Pacific is shaped by diverse histories, geographies, political systems, and threat perceptions. India, for example, is a civilisational state with rising economic weight. Indonesia stands as an archipelagic nation on track to become a top-five economy. South Korea is shaped by the security realities of the Korean Peninsula. Japan is still guided by its pacifist constitution, while the Pacific Island countries – deeply vulnerable to climate impacts – all see the region differently.
This diversity raises two questions: Do these countries in the region see enough alignment in interests to work together meaningfully? And can cooperation be sustained without relying on major-power leadership?
Historically multilateral institutions were conceived as the optimal option, providing a universal platform for nations on a whole range of issues. But their limitations have become increasingly visible, aided by the United States’ withdrawal from the World Health Organisation, the Paris Agreement and cuts to USAID.
This is where issues-based coalitions are becoming a central theme of regional diplomacy. Flexible, purpose-driven partnerships that deliver outcomes on shared concerns such as health security, climate resilience, maritime security and technology cooperation.
The Quad with its six cooperation pillars – climate, health security, critical and emerging technologies, infrastructure, space and maritime domain awareness – demonstrates that countries with different political systems can still collaborate when interests converge. For example, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness launched in 2022 gives regional partners access to cost-effective, near-real-time radio frequency data to counter illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing as well as other maritime threats.
And other minilateral and trilateral arrangements are growing. The Australia–India–Indonesia trilateral focuses on maritime safety and blue economy cooperation, while the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative among Australia, India, and Japan works to reduce dependency on single suppliers in areas such as semiconductors and critical minerals.
What stands out is that these initiatives are driven not by hard power but by capability building and resilience, and as a direct response to the region’s evolving needs.
This shift aligns with “resilience diplomacy”, the idea of strengthening diplomatic, institutional and societal capacity to absorb shocks. Insights from our (Australia India Institute) Track 1.5 dialogues underline that while Indo-Pacific countries often share challenges, their domestic contexts vary significantly. Effective cooperation therefor needs to begin with listening to local priorities rather than imposing external frameworks.
Australia has been quietly shaping this shifting approach in recent years. Much of the 2025–26 aid budget to the Pacific was directed toward climate adaptation and resilience-focused infrastructure, and similarly to Southeast Asia it focused on health security, climate resilience and economic growth. People-to-people connections also underpin the partnerships, with strong educational links and diaspora ties enhancing mutual trust.
Respect for regional agency is now central to Australia’s foreign policy. Whether working in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, or the Indian Ocean region, Australia seeks to co-design initiatives rather than prescribe them. That is the type of partnership needed in a region navigating the strain on multilateralism.
Indo-Pacific strategies that push towards issues-based flexible cooperation are not a rejection of multilateralism, but a way of keeping its core purpose alive. That quiet strength lies not in dominance but endurance.
This article with originally published in the Lowy Interpreter.