By Research Fellow, Teesta Prakash and Senior Policy and Research Projects Manager, Grace Corcoran
India’s Minister for Defence Shri Rajnath Singh made his first official visit to Australia last week – also marking a first visit by an Indian defence minister to the country in 13 years.
The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed five years ago made Australia only one of two countries with which India has annual leader-level meetings and a 2+2 Foreign and Defence ministers’ meeting. India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar had been expected to attend alongside Singh but was unable to make the trip.
Despite being a solo visit, Singh’s visit can be counted as a positive step for the bilateral relationship. It saw the conclusion of arrangements on mutual submarine rescue support, plans for Indian repair and maintenance of Australian Navy ships in the Indian Ocean, as well as closer information sharing. Both sides also agreed to an annual defence ministers’ dialogue and – notably from a Quad perspective, given the shaky views of the grouping at a leader-level – Australia and Japan have been invited to join the India-US Air Force Exercise COPE India. This holds promise that the Quad countries are engaging with each other meaningfully, at least across the defence services sector.
Trust was not so much regarded as a feel-good concept but one with measurable outcomes, particularly in candid exchanges about expectations during potential regional crises.
Think pieces on Australia-India relations are often littered with buzzwords like “strategic alignment” without spelling out the practical measures required to ensure the bilateral relationship can find solid and sustainable ground. To build trust between the Indian Ocean partners, it is imperative that they understand each other’s systems better. This need was highlighted by a recent report produced by the Australia India Institute.
Singh’s visit helped in advancing that trust. Both countries are increasingly looking to each other to enhance their military toolkit – with India holding a promise for large-scale manufacturing and Australia for niche intellectual property knowledge in sectors such as avionics. The first Australia-India defence industry roundtable was held during Singh’s visit, with a second such roundtable planned for next year.
Building a defence industrial relationship between Australia and India is an ambitious task. Australia’s alliance-focused defence networks do not complement India’s legacy issues with its Russian-made military kit. India’s relationship with Russia is not new, rooted in ties that date from the Cold War. However, as New Delhi carefully navigates the growing “no-limits” partnership between Russia and China, it is increasingly diversifying its own military suppliers. Delays in Russian deliveries of promised air defence systems have also added to New Delhi’s frustrations and pushed it to look for other vendors.
The question of developing trust was prominent at an Australia-India Defence Conclaveat Parliament House in Canberra held during Singh’s visit, which brought together past and present defence personnel, security experts, defence economists and officials from both sides. Trust was not so much regarded as a feel-good concept but one with measurable outcomes, particularly in candid exchanges about expectations during potential regional crises. What would Australia expect, for example, should its naval assets come under threat in the Indo-Pacific? A consistent track record of respecting one another even in those areas of disagreement is also crucial.
The announcement during Singh’s visit of further information sharing is encouraging. Exchanges of less sensitive intelligence will help build confidence and gradually expand as trust grows, marking a practical and achievable approach. These are exactly the kinds of steps needed when working together to “maintain a free, open, peaceful, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific”.